

# Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and execution by counterinsurgents

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## Abstract

This study aims to provide deep understanding regarding strategies of Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and executed by counterinsurgent. This study will involve the deep understanding regarding how insurgency emerged, reasons behind the emergence of insurgency, definition of insurgency, historical perspective about insurgency, tactics, and strategies of insurgents. The changing nature of insurgency from frontier areas to metropolitan cities. The difference between insurgents and terrorist, difference of strategies adopted by insurgent and counterinsurgent. This study will provide information regarding well known insurgencies emerged around the world. Counterinsurgency operation, the difference between hot revolutionary war and cold revolutionary war. Tactics involved in counterinsurgency, and laws and principles of counter insurgency warfare. How globalization impact the world order, same occurred in insurgency as urbanization of insurgency. Different steps to adopt to execute a successful counterinsurgency operation.

Keywords: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Violence, Terrorist, Globalization

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## Introduction

Insurgency is an armed conflict being fought in political communities since their creation. Almost all recorded annals of political history mention revolts, uprisings, mutinies and insurrections as insurgencies. Most insurgencies are different from one another. While social and economic may be main causes of insurgency, however, situations are often intensified by decisions/ policies of the political leaders. "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" written by David Galula in 1964 provides a systematic discussion regarding how to defeat insurgent (Galula, 2006). Bernard Fall - the author of 'Street Without Joy' recognized Galula's work as the best guide to counter any type of insurgency. Experiences in Southeast Asia, China, Greece and Algeria as French military officer/ attached Galula to consider the "need for a compass" and encouraged him to "define laws of countering insurgency, to deduce its principles and to outline strategy and tactics".

## Definitions of Insurgency

There are almost 284 synonyms of word 'insurgency' and most used synonyms are insurgence, uprising, mutiny, sedition, resist and insurrection, however, insurgency can be defined as under:

Encyclopedia narrates insurgency as 'an armed uprising or revolt against an established civil or political authority. Persons who are engaged in it are called insurgents. Insurgents engage themselves in regular/ guerrilla warfare against armed forces of established regime or carry out disruption/ harassment to undermine government's position as leader'.

US Military defines insurgency as 'an organized movement aimed at overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

As per Wikipedia<sup>6</sup>, insurgency is "a violent rebellion against authority (which is recognized by international organizations like UN) when those taking part in rebellion are not recognized as lawful combatants or belligerents".

- As per Oxford English Dictionary, insurgency is "an active revolt or uprising".
- Cambridge Dictionary defines insurgency as "an occasion when a group of people attempt to take control of their country by force".
- In Collins English Thesaurus, synonyms of insurgency are "rebellion, rising, revolution, resistance and revolt".

## Historical Perspective

Insurgency is apparent military option of a weak against strong, adopted by hopeful political clusters, beleaguered tribes/ classes, occupied people and by racial minorities against external conquerors or tyrannical domestic regimes. Most probably, its first recorded history dates back in 1500 BC when a letter from Hittite King Marsalis talked regarding 'irregulars who, not daring to attack me by daylight, preferred to fall on me by night' (Bhaumik, 1996). In form, scope and content, insurgencies begin as 'little wars' as defensive campaigns, as wars of resistance, often without 'any explicit ideology, organization or program' (Hobsbawm, 2000). Insurgent may begin as "social bandit" or 'pre-political peasant rebel' or as the focus of spontaneous widespread confrontation but his decisive success depends on his mastery of social nervousness, political protest,

clandestine as well as unconcealed military act and his capability to unite all this into one single but not always Uni-linear revolutionary struggle. At the end, insurgencies often culminate into wars of nationwide liberation, fundamental socialism, racial self-determination or blend of some or all the above. They may degenerate into lawlessness or organized crime or just end as terrorist movement, incapable of achieving their goals. WW-II marked the foundation of the culmination of Euro-centric international system which had dominated the world for more than two centuries. During colonial disengagement, previous colonies were exposed to vicious conflicts stemming from integral partition of language, religion and society which had either remained dormant or had seen subtly manipulated by colonial powers. These hidden sources of conflict surfaced as the prospect of colonial withdrawal drew closer. The boundaries inherited by new states were, in most cases, mock legacies of colonization often 'incongruent with the natural distributions of social, economic, linguistic and cultural traits of human populations' (Bhaumik,1996). This shaped a two-tier fight in what came to be loosely characterized as Third World clash between new nation-states within an area and between prevailing reigning groups and disenchanting nervous minorities within nation-states. Display and contents of these conflicts interacted with evolving world system; ideologically bi-polar in initial stages which produced world order. Consequential uncertainty in global system was as much a consequence of ideological pretensions of key powers, as of integral weaknesses of post-colonial Third World nation states. World then observed minor wars fought mostly by Third World nation states with the support of rival super-power. These "little wars" have transformed countries into international or multi-national battlefields as lengthy insurgent's campaigns fought between guerrilla outfits and national armies or foreign troops, have been orchestrated by rival neighbors or hostile super-power. Each of these fights have been characterized as a local insurgency, fueled by varying degrees of outside backing, sharpened by military and political response of concerned nation states or interventionist power and complicated by varied patterns of global response. Since WW-II, there were, on average, eight armed conflicts going on somewhere in the world at any given time (Banerjee,2021).

Insurgency varies from resistance movement both in its political connotations and in conflict. An insurgency implies an interior struggle against established government whereas a resistance means a struggle against occupying foreign forces and their agents. (Banerjee,2021)

Insurgency is commonly used to pronounce a movement's illegality by virtue of not being authorized by or in accordance with regulations of the land. When used by a state or authority under threat, 'insurgency' indicates an illegitimacy of cause. In case of rebellion, term 'insurgents' mentions to those who are not part of any decision-making body that has the capacity to make laws/ regulations.

Tomes (Robert Tomes), in an article identifies following four elements which 'typically encompass an insurgency': -

- Cell networks that maintain secrecy.
- Terror used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the movement

for protection.

- Multi-faceted attempts to cultivate support in general population, often by undermining the new regime.
- Attacks against the government.

### Causes of Insurgency

Naturally, humans are peace-loving creatures. At the same time, as society, they do not tolerate indiscriminate injustice hence they often fight for self-rule. Injustice and oppression have always led to resentments often leading to disasters before re-establishment of peace. Miseries and deaths have never deterred societies from fighting for their right. Since creation of the world, there have been oppressors who have always been fought by the oppressed hence the cycle follows. All insurgencies are dissimilar and there is disparity among them, although some similarities also exist. Insurgency thrives on a society with socio-economic disparities between classes. Societal cleavages along racial, ethnic and religious lines are commonly the root causes of insurgency. Advent and degree of intensity of insurgency is related to political inadequacies. While social and economics may be the primary causes of uprising, situations are often intensified by decisions/policies by the political leaders.

### Tactics and Strategies of Insurgents

Insurgents often vary their tactics / strategies, engaging different targets simultaneously. Ambush and raid are most common choice practiced by insurgents in dominated area. Furthermore, insurgents also establish links with other double agents to achieve their objectives. In such scenarios, some militants are also launched by enemy states. Insurgents usually resort to suicidal attacks, bombing, shooting, kidnapping, hostage-taking, hijacking and number of other violence to target power structure and other facilities of the government. Insurgents commonly limit their attacks to military targets and usually avoid targeting civil populace. While terrorists show little respect to civilians and collateral damage.

Religious teachings and social aspects have substantial impact on insurgents' strategies. For example, Islam allows veneration for humans and shuns bloodshed. While Hindu religion does not give equal treatment to all hence allows ill-treatment to lower caste Hindus.

Many a times, insurgents carry out violent actions but do not announce group's identification. Normally, an individual with symbolic status throughout the movement becomes its main leader. Leaders of different backgrounds from insurgency movement may, at times, hijack an insurgency.

Insurgents use asymmetrical tactics because insurgents' potentials are mostly poorer to government's capabilities. Insurgents' attacks may take the form of attacks on supply lines or security troops using concealed explosives. These explosives may be prepared from military materials, are camouflaged along routes and detonated when transports/security troops come within its distance. Insurgents recurrently use ambushes against

military targets with all types of weapons. Insurgent's use crowded and restricted terrain as force multiplier using cover to launch ambushes and as a force inhibitor against targeted enemy. Such attacks are normally broken off without waiting for support or reinforcement.

### Changing Nature of Insurgency

In present-day times, one of key fears of government officials, national security experts, militaries and scholars are ongoing changes in nature of insurgency. Cold War insurgencies intended at capturing state power and forming a national government by guerrilla forces. Modern insurgencies are characterized by use of internet/ other forms of information technology, dependence on terrorism rather than military actions, capability to make own financial resources rather than relying on external sponsors and desire to create political space in which to function rather than confiscation of state power. Government security forces are still trying to comprehend changing nature of current insurgencies and find ways to counter these. This is a common form since insurgencies often take the system of learning contests between insurgents and counter-insurgents.

### Difference between Insurgent and Terrorist

Insurgency pattern is relatively different from terrorist pattern of actions. Insurgents are representatives of deeper concerns or grievances within population. Governments try to counter insurgency mainly through 'winning hearts and minds measures - WHAM measures' of populace - a course that by compulsion often involves negotiation and conciliation. Often insurgents' approaches are regarded as intolerable, but their grievances are often seen as valid if these are pursued peacefully. Therefore, ordinary society often accepts insurgents who normally abandon violence but seek their objectives through political means. Similarly, under this paradigm, insurgents practice violence within a sensibly integrated politico-military policy rather than as psychopaths. In this pattern, insurgency is a whole-of-government issue rather than an armed or law-enforcement agencies issue. Therefore, law enforcing agencies use a strategy-based tactics to counterinsurgency where the main objective is to counter or downgrade insurgent's strategy rather than to arrest culprits of explicit act.

<b>Principal Differences between Terrorism and Insurgency Paradigms (Galula,2006)</b>	
<b><u>Terrorism</u></b>	<b><u>Insurgency</u></b>
Terrorism is law-enforcement issue	Insurgency is whole government issue
Terrorist is taken as unrepresentative deviation	Insurgent represents grave issues of a society
No negotiation with terrorists	WHAM measures very necessary
Methods/ objectives not acceptable	Methods are not acceptable but objectives not necessarily so
Terrorists are psychologically and morally flawed with personal tendencies towards violence	Insurgents use violence within integrated politico-military strategy. Violence is instrumental not central to their approach
Counterterrorism adopts case-based. Focus on catching perpetrators of terrorist actions	Counterinsurgency uses strategy-based approach focusing on defeating insurgents' strategy; catching them is secondary approach

**Note.** Some analysts regard terrorism as sub-categories of insurgency. Insurgency paradigm provides a better approach to counter-insurgency strategy which has following streams:

- a. Pacification.
- b. Winning hearts and minds measures.
- c. Denial of sanctuary and external sponsorship.

#### Difference between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents by David Galula (Galula,2006)

Component	Insurgent	Counterinsurgent
Resource	Asymmetry - limited resources / Power	Preponderance power of resources
Objective – population	Solicit government oppression	Show that destabilizing
Political nature of war	Wage war for minds of population	Wage war for same and to keep Legitimacy
Gradual transition to war	Use time to develop cause	Always in reactive mode
Protracted nature of war	Disperse; use limited violence widely	Maintain vigilance; sustain will
Cost	High return for investment	Sustained operations carry high political/ economic burden
Role of ideology	Sole asset at beginning is cause or idea	Defeat root of cause or idea

### Well-known Insurgencies of the World

Insurgencies have existed in many countries and regions including Philippines, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Northeast India, Yemen, Djibouti, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Congo, in American colonies of Great Britain and the Confederate States of America (Anderson,2007). Each had different specifications but shared the property of disrupting central government. Salient of some well-known insurgencies with counterinsurgencies methods are as follows (Galula,2006): -

Insurgency	Counterinsurgency Methods	Remarks
Malaya	Re-settlement program. Use of surrendered enemy personnel Special forces deep penetration patrols Framework security operations. Key infrastructure protection Hearts and minds program. Political concessions	Measures covered a good spread of methods. These were initially ill coordinated but improved dramatically with central coordination. Socio-political measures became effective once. security measures began to 'bite'.
Darul Islam, Indonesia	Pagar Betis (civilian cordon operations) Village defense organizations Pacification strategy Civic action program Decapitation strikes Deep penetration patrols. Infrastructure/ route security	Measures addressed most areas with a preference for co-opting civil populations, harsh collective punishments and decapitation strikes. Most successful in 1959- 62 when integrated at theatre level.
Palestinian (Al Qsa) Intifada	Decapitation strikes - targeted killings Palestinian territories security barrier Settlement demolition/ resettlement Restrictions on leaders' movement Incursions into refugee camps Border control operations Route and key point security	Measures cover a full spread of options with a preference for attacks on nodes and links rather than territorial control, civic action or hearts and minds. Measures appear well coordinated.
Northern Ireland	Framework security operations Province reaction force Intelligence-led covert operations Political concessions Key infrastructure and route security Border control operations Use of informants & locally raised	Measures cover the full range, with a preference for denying boundary, interactions, penetrating and disrupting links, and political concessions to undermine the insurgent cause.

## COUNTERINSURGENCY

Counterinsurgency is defined as the measured taken by a legitimate political government to defeat an uprising insurgency. For an effective and successful counterinsurgency policy it requires integration and synchronization of Political, Security, Legal, Economic, Development and Psychological efforts to create a favorable scenario aimed to weak the position of insurgent. While making government as a more effective institution in the opinion of local public. (US Govt,2012)

In contemporary world, there are two kinds of insurgencies are existing: -

- Cold Revolutionary/Insurgency War.
- Hot Revolutionary/Insurgency War.

These both kind of insurgencies are different in kind of actions those are taken by an insurgent to pressurize the legitimate political government and to counter these kind of insurgencies governments take different actions.

### **Cold Revolutionary War.**

The Cold Revolutionary War is known as a political struggle or a peaceful protest any policy or action taken by the ruling political government. That does not include any kind of physical violence or actions against the political government and remained at whole legal level.

Four kinds of actions taken against any Cold Revolutionary war: -

- a. Directly Act on the insurgent leader.
- b. Act on those conditions those are favorable for insurgency.
- c. Infiltrate the insurgent's movement and make it ineffective.
- d. Build up or reinforce the political machine. (Galula,2006)
- e.

### **Directly Act on the Insurgent Leader**

Most of the time insurgent don't have his own life he may act on orders, he act accordingly as he received his orders from his leaders, who are mainly the main actors and the key elements of insurgency. Through using legal method like arrest, them, impeach them in court, ban their organization or by banning their publication to restrict their contact ability to very few people if it is necessary provides positive results.

Because such methods are easy to adopt and apply in kingdom ship or authoritarian regime but for a democratic government it may create the situation more complex and open a new Pandora box for the government that make situation more crucial. To avoid this kind of response may have to make amendments in their law or provide some special powers to the security forces to cope with insurgent.

### **Indirect action against insurgent.**

By research using intelligence and other measures by identifying the weaknesses of insurgent looks easy to take against the insurgent. By using Judiciary as way to threaten, strengthening the role of bureaucracy and by making police and other law enforcement agencies more powerful will become a cause to discourage any attempt of insurgency.

### **Infiltration of the insurgent movement.**

New insurgent who joins the insurgent movement recently always act as unprofessional and he may be easy to know his movement by infiltrating on him by other agents, they may disintegrate him from his

original mission or objective. If they will not succeed in this, they may be able to report his activity that will be helpful to perform any kind of other action.

**Strengthening the Political Machinery.** In this kind of action government build or initiate a new kind of institution or program at gross root level to overcome the domestic and local problems that will isolate insurgent from the population and an alone insurgent is unable to create a big problem. (Metz,2004)

#### **Hot Revolutionary War.**

This was the time when security forces are ordered to step into the situation because of the crucial situation that is unable to control by civil institutions. Hot revolutionary war may identify through these general indicators.

- (1) Insurgent has been succeeded in building a political organization.
- (2) He is directing an elite party leading by making a united front.
- (3) A large revolutionary movement bound by a cause. (Galula,2006)

### **Laws and Principles of counterinsurgency warfare**

#### **Limits of conventional forces.**

Through deploying efficient forces and number of troops to restrict the insurgent to penetrate over a garrison a red area. To defeat the insurgent only military action is not sufficient because military action need intelligence and intelligence will be available through participation and help of local population and local population will not help until they feel themselves safe. It also needs to quick response against any information at initial stage like If any news receives that guerilla is spotted a rapid action require because the rapid action play role of surprise that make morale down of opponent party.

#### **Why does the Insurgent warfare not work for Counterinsurgent?**

Because of the time insurgent use lethal approaches and physical violence as tool to achieve its target. He did not think about any collateral damage or harming any innocent or local person he uses the terrorism as a tool of disorder. Insurgent's warfare does not work for counterinsurgent because basic aim of counterinsurgent is to stop or restrict the policies of insurgent.

#### **The First Law: The support of population, Is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.**

Main problem faced by counterinsurgent is that how to keep an area clean, so the counterinsurgent forces feel safe to operate elsewhere. Support from the local population is very necessary because its relatively easy to disperse and expel an insurgent from the area through purely military actions. But it is impossible to restrict the comeback insurgent guerillas in same area after some time and re-unite their force and rebuild their political structure unless the local population may not cooperate (Galula,2006).

#### **The Second Law: Support is gained through an active minority.**

Main question occurred as ho to gain support through support from the local population, Support not in a form of sympathies when it required to participate to fight against the insurgent they will also fight besides the forces. It will be noted that in any kind of situation, whatever the cause of situation is the local population will divide into three categories, one is the neutral majority those are not supporting the insurgent neither security forces, Second the active minority supporting the cause these are the local supporters of insurgent and the Third and last one these are the active minority against the insurgent cause these are the objective of security forces. The support in favor of security will be gain through the neutral majority and active minority against the cause by making them feel safe and providing them immunities and other liabilities.

### **Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare.**

Victory in Counterinsurgency is not only related to the destruction of enemy forces and his political organization or expel him from the local area or own territory. But the victory is to permanently isolate the insurgent from the local population and the isolation is not enforced upon the local population but they themselves realize that what is good for them because isolation of insurgent is maintained by and with the people not the security forces (Metz,2004).

### **The Third Law: Support from the population is conditional.**

Effective Political actions for the local population to address their problem required while military and police operations are carried out against the guerillas and the political organization of the insurgent to end the insurgency. Political, economic, social and other reforms are also necessary to perform in these areas to make local population feel happy and safe to become popular among the local population. Because without these efforts all other activities remained inoperative because the insurgent is still controlling the population.

### **The Fourth Law: Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.**

The operation is needed to realize the population that insurgent threat came to an end and convince them that counterinsurgent is more capable and ultimate win of this war is related to counterinsurgent. The win of counterinsurgent is necessary due to intensive nature of area and for the long run of peace. To achieve these objective states, have to apply more means and to invest in locals by providing them good facilities because other side is also ready to provide some facilities, but ultimate win is related to the one who spend more, and the insurgent has less resources so government may be able to win the heart of local population (Galula,2006).

## **Strategy of the Counterinsurgency.**

In a selected Area:

- Move Sufficient troops to the infected area those are enough capable to destroy the main armed body of insurgent.
- Deploy maximum numbers of troops after military operation to counter the comeback of guerillas in an area.
- Develop harmony and strong relations with local population.
- To maintain peace in area its necessary to destroy armed as well as political organization of insurgent.
- Set up the new local authorities on provisional level for local civil administration.
- To test these new provisional local authorities provide them some important tasks to check their capabilities regarding governers.
- To educate and enhance the psychological level of local communities provide them opportunity to join political forum to resolve and raise their local issues at political forums.
- It is important to win or destroy the last remaining remnants of insurgents in area. (Galula,2006)

### **Economy of Forces.**

It is only achieved through the denial of insurgent to take help from outside or take guard in anywhere in safe heaven, to achieve this agenda it's important to do successful raids. Through continuous and successful raids insurgent may not be capable to be strong or reinforce themselves to launch any kind of counter attacks.

**Irreversibility.**

This is an important task to deploy forces until the population become independent or the local para-military forces become capable to secure their area and to counter any kind of external or internal guerilla movement. By making forces and population capable to counter any kind of rebuilt of insurgent movement in future is a no mean achievement. (Galula,2006)

**Initiative.**

The offensive strategy part is considered as the regain of the natural initiative from the insurgent by counterinsurgent to make a complete success. This is because on the national level counterinsurgent must decide its main area of efforts on national level. As soon as possible the counterinsurgent accomplishes its idea to achieve natural initiative from insurgent, counterinsurgent become independent and no longer follow the root and will of the insurgent to counterinsurgency.

**Complete Utilization of Counterinsurgent Assets.**

Through achievement of the trust of the local public counterinsurgent remain no longer an alien to the local and prove himself as their defender. To secure public interest to improve the living standard of local they must use complete resources like economy, military, media and population (Galula,2006).

**Simplicity.**

The era from peace to war is a very slow process and its very crucial to truly understand the root cause of gradual transition from peace to war. The main objective for counterinsurgent is to the local population, military forces and political actions cannot be remained separate from each other. Use of military and security forces to resolve any dispute is efficient due to their harsh character but that is not a true mean to resolve any issue.

**To Command is to Control.**

Counterinsurgent can enhance his area of command through providing different task to different persons those prove themselves capable to accomplish their respective task in time. Through this kind of strategy counterinsurgent can move war from a general area to specific location that is truly affected by the insurgent. Counterinsurgent can divide his task in his subordinates to check their capabilities because he is able to verify that which person is capable to perform respective task.

**Urbanization of Insurgency.**

Till the start of 21<sup>st</sup> century insurgency remains a word that can remind anyone about difficult terrain, border areas. But after the start of 21<sup>st</sup> century concept of insurgency changed into the urbanized kind of insurgency. Now the battle ground become the metro cities which are highly populated and easy to attack. People from different areas, ethnicities and religions gathered in same place but still metro cities of different countries are not capable to fulfill the demands of all residents. So, the scarcity of resources causing complex situation in metro cities.

Due to lack of resources food, place to live and job young generation of metro cities are an easy target for an insurgent on the name of language, ethnicity and rights. Young generation is also stressed due to lack of opportunities, so they become an easy target of an insurgent organization.

Presence of Media and rapid response from media on every issue also make situation critical for military forces to take a free step. Due to era of hybrid warfare if security may use force or take a strict action against anyone media will open a Pandora box by involving different human rights organization and other MNC's.

Urbanized Insurgency is more dangerous and crucial kind of insurgency comparatively than traditional insurgency. In traditional insurgency in a border area less important targets and easy to defend but in metro cities many targets can be selected by an insurgent to destroy, and it is a difficult task for security agencies to secure all targets. Chance of collateral damage remains high due to high population so high risk of collateral damage. High populated areas reduce chance to use heavy weapons or any kind of air support. (Hoffman, 1995)

In counterinsurgency in urban areas like metro cities political governments avoid taking any strict military action and rely on legislation in constitution and laws.

Political government in any counterinsurgency in urbanized area may follow these steps:

- Limit the right of public gathering by implementing special laws.
- Limit the right of possession and demonstration of weapons at public places.
- Imprisonment of any person without trial.
- Search of any public place without warrant.
- Use of human intelligence
- Through providing special training to military forces to fight in different terrain.
- Special equipment supplies to the military forces.
- Unique doctrine based on counterterrorism operations and traditional counterinsurgent operations. (US Govt, 2012)

### Literature Review.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Reconceptualization Threat and Response. The Article "*Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*" is written by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. They both explain the views and response of the United States on insurgency. In their article they mentioned that in contemporary era the U.S. is more silent on the issue of insurgency same as the peak of Cold War. In this article they said that the U.S. national security is still not ready for an active response or participation against insurgency. They also said that the U.S. at that time more focused toward the kind of national insurgence and not involving in the liberated one or to help other countries in counterinsurgency. They expressed that due to focus of the U.S. on national insurgencies rather than the liberated one the U.S. is focus toward attaining its economic, security, informational and intelligence capabilities to address the root causes of the short-term insurgencies. Moreover, they said the key to success is not in to become better counterinsurgent for the U.S. military but to make local forces and intelligence forces capable to counter these kinds of insurgencies. (Metz, 2004)

"*Counterinsurgency warfare (theory and practice)*" written by David Galula. In his book he thoroughly explained the modes of insurgency warfare, reason behind the insurgency. He explained that how insurgency rise in any what are the reason behind the insurgency which kind of insurgency is emerging. He also explained and provide the indicators about different

insurgencies. In his book he explained various forms of insurgencies and how to tackle with these kinds of insurgencies. He provided different options to deal with different kinds of insurgencies on political and armed level. He did explain that what are the consequences for a democratic government if hard actions were taken against the insurgent. In his book he writes the different strategies to deal with insurgencies. He provided different laws to succeed in any insurgency. He explained the role of local population against the insurgent. In his book he focused to get support from the population and make local population capable to counter any kind of future insurgency attempts. In the last section he provided the implementation process of a successful counterinsurgency doctrine. (Galula,2006)

This Article *“The Urbanization of insurgency: The potential challenges to US army operations”* is written by Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman. In this article they stated the emerging challenges to the world in the shape of urbanization of insurgency when more than 200,000 cities are considered as the metro cities and 50,000 metro cities belongs to the African states. Urbanization of insurgency is a global threat, but they said the U.S.is leader of the world and must have to draw some kinds of doctrine or policy to counter urbanization of insurgency. They said after the end of World War 2 insurgency movements started in colonial states and the imperial colonialist failed to counter these insurgency movement due to lack in their intelligence capabilities. Modern mode of urbanized insurgency required more accurate information due to in metro cities insurgents may have many targets and chance of collateral damage become high. So, states must acquire modern technology, make a unique doctrine, train their forces to fight on different terrains. (Hoffman,1995)

*“Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency”* is an official government document published by the U.S. government. This document defines the reason and overcome the insurgency movement by targeting their key area. They focused on the grass root causes of insurgence and argue to first identify the reasons and supporter of insurgency movement. In this document they define to target the leadership of the insurgency, they explain the theory of victory as per insurgent, form where the insurgents getting the popular support and how the insurgents are using their logistical support. They also mentioned the role of political government how they were taking the conflict, the military capabilities and efficiencies to counter the insurgency and most important image of the state at international level how support they have on international forums. In this report they also mentioned the stages of insurgencies like insurgent victory, political factor involved in insurgency, military operations to counter and eliminate guerillas threat, peace settlement between both parties the government and the insurgent. (US Govt,2012)

#### EXECUTION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE:

World has witnessed more than 300 insurgencies of all sorts since WW-II. In approximately 36%, the governments countering the insurgency were victorious. The insurgents were also victorious in almost 36%, whereas, in 28% mixed results were achieved. Average duration of insurgency has approximately been 21 years. To confront an insurgency is one of the most difficult types of warfare due to its uncertain situation, difficulty in identification of friend and foe and nature of politico social & cultural differences. Before we proceed further here is a need to have a quick glance on approaches prescribed by military and defense scholar David Kicullen (Kicullen,2013).

As per David Kilcullen, there are two approaches to deal with counter insurgency operations i.e., Population centric and enemy centric. Both approaches are being deliberated as under: -

### **Population Centric Approach.**

This approach is based on population focused and aims at saving as much population as possible and to avoid the collateral damage. In this approach, the population is protected by displacing innocent people to a safer place and then force is applied to eradicate the insurgents. This approach has four basic components i.e., population of insurgent area, the controlling government, that insurgents and counterinsurgent force. The basic focus is to prevent the population from becoming targets or used as shields by the insurgent groups. The approach was given by David Kilcullen and was applied in Afghanistan in 2009 which gave positive results. A separatist insurgency, the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC), troubled the government of Senegal for two full decades. Early on, the group “capitalized upon the grievances of the local populations and received support from them.” (Wagafane, 2006)

### **Enemy Centric Approach.**

The supporters of this approach define it that counterinsurgency is the offshoot of conventional warfare and counterinsurgent as an organized enemy. Hence, they believe that the main task of any counterinsurgency campaign is to fight or eradicate the enemy. In this approach however, there are two schools of thought i.e., ‘soft line’ and ‘hard line’ approaches. The bottom line is that first beat the enemy and all else will follow. Difference between friend and foe is very ambiguous. Therefore, there are more chances of collateral damage in the operation.

Here, we come to the execution phase of the counterinsurgency warfare. When fighting the counterinsurgency, the force involved will transform the level from strategy to tactics with major fundamental changes. Following are the steps that counterinsurgent will take: -

### **Selection of Area of Efforts**

- There are two different approaches being adopted by the counter insurgence while selecting the area in which operations are carried out i.e., difficult to easy and other one is easy to difficult. The first approach difficult to easy requires many efforts as it is starting from red spot where the insurgent’s main hub is available to the soft area. However, the second one requires fewer efforts as it is processing in a synchronized way proceeding from softening up of target in stages. While selecting the area of efforts, factors being considered for conventional war such as terrain, climate, means of communication etc. remain valid. The counter insurgence should find out natural obstacle like sea, rivers, plains and deserts etc. and incorporate them for advantageous gains.
- Factors pertaining to population require utmost importance statics about population, urban or rural distribution, sympathies for insurgents, political influence and religious factors etc.

### **Political Impressions**

While fitting the insurgence, the counter insurgent must find out the cause and ideology on which the insurgent has formed its agenda. A counter cause is hence necessary for the counter insurgent as per David Galula (Galula, 2006) in his book “Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”. Political intervention for acquiring the sympathies and sport of local population for the counter cause given by government is very important. Time management is very important in this regard. Whether the counter insurgence publicized his program too early or too late. As per David Galula (Galula, 2006) in his book “Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” if program publicized too early it can be taken as a sign of weakness, raise the insurgents’

demands and can encourage the insurgent to motivate population for concession. If the program is publicized very late, it can prompt the population against the government. However, it is very important to take a timely decision.

### **Military Operations**

The military operations require preparation like setting of goals by the military leadership with respect to time and space. The information about enemy is must like, unity and coordination among insurgent groups, way of recruiting and training of insurgents their arms supply system, size of enemy forces, funding, external support, leadership infrastructure and graveness of insurgent's fighter etc. must be acquired before entering the battle ground.

### **The Operation Stage**

- As per David Galula (Galula, 2006) in his book "Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" there are eight steps in completion of a military operation i.e.: -

#### **Step One - The Destruction or Expulsion of the Insurgent.**

In this stage the complete focus is given to destroy the insurgent leadership, infrastructure and hideouts. No relief or sympathies can be extended unless the insurgents are unarmed and submit to the will of government. No escape routes should be left open to the insurgent fighters. The counter insurgent should utilize all maximum available resources for gathering of intelligence of move of the insurgent and pinpoint targeting and timely execution.

#### **Step Two - Deployment of Static Units.**

The static units must be deployed to protect the line of communications and for safety of national infrastructure. Full support be extended to local population and government to ally them on government side.

#### **Step Three- Contact with and Control of the Population.**

Contacting the population and providing them sense of security will help gaining the control of population. This must be across the board, keeping in view the demographic distribution of the population.

#### **Step Four - Destruction of the Insurgent Political Organization.**

Identifying the location and radius of influence of insurgent political organizations and their destruction is very important to maintain the law-and-order situation. No sympathy be shown to any political element of the insurgents. All sleeping cells be destroyed immediately.

#### **Step Five-Local Elections.**

The next step in this contact is local elections. Local elections should be organized immediately without any delay as per the prescribed constitutional parameters. This will help the population elect their representatives and adopt in a constitutional process.

#### **Step Sixth-Testing the Local Leaders.**

After the political infrastructure is build up, the first step is to test new elected leader. The test is very simple: They are given concrete tasks and judged on the ability to fulfill them. These tasks should be within the limits of governmental organizations and capability of newly raised political infrastructure. However, in fulfilling these tasks the newly elected leader or vulnerable to the insurgent. Due care must be taken in order to protect the newly elected leader and their families or supporters.

#### **Step Seventh- Organizing the Party.**

Organizing the party structure is very important due to one or all the following reasons: -

- The party system is the most important instrument of the politics.
- The newly found leaders who operate locally will find a platform and can complete their tasks within prescribed organization.
- Power over population can only be exercised through administrative control. This can be achieved while retaining a position within the party.
- The leaders need a framework and an ideology to complete their political aims. For this purpose, affiliation with political party is very important.

#### **Step Eight- Winning Over or Suppressing the Last Guerrillas.**

The counterinsurgent after losing will however, will not set idly. He will try to re-organize the infrastructure and refill the vacant areas. For this purpose, a complete setup of intelligence-based organization be formed in order to eradicate the last guerrilla and refrain the insurgents from re-organizing and becoming a potent force once again. The factors of foreign support, interest of non-state actors, local political and regional leader's interest and arms supply be rectified, contained and eliminated timely. Rehabilitation centers be made under government support and the surrendered insurgents be made part of society. Utmost efforts should be made to avoid any collateral damage by not becoming prey to local political agendas / motives.

#### **Conclusion**

It is not always possible to defeat insurgency, as is, evident from Vietnam, Malaya and Afghanistan. However, to control the minds of opponents and to win the hearts of the local population which is the subject of both proponents in this war it is important to exercise the right of the government and to achieve the political cause for which the counter insurgency operation has been carried out. The kinetic counter insurgency operations are aimed not only on extricating or destroying the insurgent but, is a temporary action to make a way out for political process to develop.

In this regard, the major role is always played by the political bodies. The political grievances are not addressed with suppression and aggression policy. They have always to be addressed by mutual understanding of political and cultural motives. In a country where the borders are porous and prone to outside support, the chances of reformation, re-organization and re- happening of such insurgences are always there. It is, therefore, the responsibility of all stake holders of a nation i.e legislation, judiciary, executive media and corporate sectors to play positive role in order to avoid the loss that can be caused because of happening of these insurgences. The insurgences do not develop from political cause to armed struggle over night. There are many mistakes by the different pillars of the state which contribute to the development and increase of such menace. It is, however, the responsibility of every individual of the society in general and governmental / administrative organizations to put in the positive input and eliminate the injustice, that is the mother cause of all evils.

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